forked from kenzuya/unshackle
fix(remote): forward nested service cache files to and from the server
Cache keys are now the path relative to the service cache dir without .json, so Cacher keys like session_web/<sha1> reach the remote session. The credential filter runs on every path segment, the suffix is appended rather than substituted, and both sides cap the map at 64 keys.
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@@ -1408,7 +1408,11 @@ class RemoteService:
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return
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from unshackle.core.api.compression import safe_inflate
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import safe_cache_key
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS, safe_cache_key
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if len(cache_data) > MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS:
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self.log.warning(f"Ignoring {len(cache_data)} cache files from server: more than {MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS}")
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return
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cache_dir = config.directories.cache / self.service_tag
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cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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@@ -1420,7 +1424,10 @@ class RemoteService:
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continue
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try:
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decompressed = safe_inflate(base64.b64decode(content))
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(cache_dir / safe_name).with_suffix(".json").write_bytes(decompressed)
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# Not with_suffix: that would turn the key "keys.v2" into "keys.json".
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target = cache_dir / f"{safe_name}.json"
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target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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target.write_bytes(decompressed)
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except Exception as e:
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self.log.warning(f"Failed to save returned cache file '{safe_name}': {e}")
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@@ -1432,10 +1439,17 @@ class RemoteService:
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The client cannot rely on the server to filter, so it sends only the files
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it can tie to the active credential or profile, plus service-global state.
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At worst, a withheld file makes the server authenticate again.
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Each cache key is the file path relative to the service cache directory,
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with posix separators and no ``.json`` suffix, so it equals the ``Cacher``
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cache key the service reads it with (``session_web/<sha1>``). The relevance check
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runs on every path segment, because a service may embed the credential
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digest or profile name in a directory name as well as in the basename.
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"""
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import zlib
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from unshackle.commands.dl import dl
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import safe_cache_key
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cache_dir = config.directories.cache / self.service_tag
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if not cache_dir.is_dir():
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@@ -1450,13 +1464,14 @@ class RemoteService:
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foreign = set(profiles) - {active} if isinstance(profiles, dict) else set()
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files: Dict[str, str] = {}
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for f in cache_dir.glob("*.json"):
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if f.stem.startswith("titles_"):
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for f in sorted(cache_dir.rglob("*.json")):
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key = f.relative_to(cache_dir).as_posix()[: -len(".json")]
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if f.stem.startswith("titles_") or not safe_cache_key(key):
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continue
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if not cache_stem_is_relevant(f.stem, allowed, active, foreign):
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self.log.debug(f"Withholding cache file from the remote server: {f.stem}")
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if not all(cache_stem_is_relevant(part, allowed, active, foreign) for part in key.split("/")):
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self.log.debug(f"Withholding cache file from the remote server: {key}")
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continue
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files[f.stem] = base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(f.read_bytes())).decode("ascii")
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files[key] = base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(f.read_bytes())).decode("ascii")
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return files
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