forked from kenzuya/unshackle
fix(remote): forward nested service cache files to and from the server
Cache keys are now the path relative to the service cache dir without .json, so Cacher keys like session_web/<sha1> reach the remote session. The credential filter runs on every path segment, the suffix is appended rather than substituted, and both sides cap the map at 64 keys.
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from aiohttp import web
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from unshackle.core.api.compression import safe_inflate
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from unshackle.core.api.errors import APIError, APIErrorCode, categorize_exception, handle_api_exception
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from unshackle.core.api.input_bridge import AuthStatus, InputBridge
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import safe_cache_key, sanitize_log
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS, safe_cache_key, sanitize_log
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from unshackle.core.api.session_log import SessionLogBuffer, SessionLogMirror, capture_service_logs
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from unshackle.core.api.session_store import SessionStore
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from unshackle.core.cacher import Cacher
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@@ -1111,7 +1111,6 @@ def drm_preference_name(track: Any) -> Optional[str]:
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MANIFEST_DATA_KEYS = ("hls", "dash", "ism")
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MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS = 64
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def serialize_track_data(track: Any) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
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@@ -3016,7 +3015,12 @@ async def session_create_handler(data: Dict[str, Any], request: Optional[web.Req
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if not isinstance(content, str):
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raise APIError(APIErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, "cache values must be base64 strings")
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decompressed = safe_inflate(base64.b64decode(content)).decode("utf-8")
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(cache_dir / safe_name).with_suffix(".json").write_text(decompressed, encoding="utf-8")
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target = cache_dir / f"{safe_name}.json"
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try:
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target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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target.write_text(decompressed, encoding="utf-8")
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except OSError as e:
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log.warning(f"Skipping session cache key {sanitize_log(key)}: {e}")
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bridge = InputBridge()
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service_instance._input_bridge = bridge
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@@ -4452,12 +4456,14 @@ async def session_delete_handler(session_id: str, request: Optional[web.Request]
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if cache_tag and session.client_auth:
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cache_dir = app_config.directories.cache / cache_tag
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if cache_dir.is_dir():
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for f in cache_dir.glob("*.json"):
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if not f.stem.startswith("titles_"):
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try:
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cache_data[f.stem] = base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(f.read_bytes())).decode("ascii")
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except OSError:
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pass
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for f in sorted(cache_dir.rglob("*.json")):
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key = f.relative_to(cache_dir).as_posix()[: -len(".json")]
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if f.stem.startswith("titles_") or not safe_cache_key(key):
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continue
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try:
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cache_data[key] = base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(f.read_bytes())).decode("ascii")
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except OSError:
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pass
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await store.delete(session_id)
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@@ -2,9 +2,13 @@
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from pathlib import PureWindowsPath
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from typing import Optional
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MAX_CACHE_KEY_DEPTH = 8
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MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS = 64
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def sanitize_log(value: object) -> str:
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"""Sanitise a value for safe logging by removing newlines and control characters."""
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@@ -12,17 +16,28 @@ def sanitize_log(value: object) -> str:
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def safe_cache_key(key: object) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Return a bare filename for a peer-supplied cache key, or None if it escapes its directory.
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"""Return a relative posix path for a peer-supplied cache key, or None if it escapes its directory.
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unshackle writes each cache key as ``<key>.json`` inside a fixed directory. A cache key
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that holds a path separator, ``..``, or an absolute path would let the peer write outside
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that directory, so this function rejects anything that is not already a plain filename.
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unshackle writes each cache key as ``<key>.json`` inside a fixed directory, and a key may
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hold ``/`` to place the file in a subdirectory (``Cacher`` keys such as ``session_web/<sha1>``).
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A cache key with a drive letter, a root, a ``..`` or ``.`` segment, an empty segment, a
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control character, or more than ``MAX_CACHE_KEY_DEPTH`` segments would let the peer write
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outside that directory or build an unbounded tree, so this function rejects it.
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PureWindowsPath treats both ``/`` and ``\\`` as separators, so this function rejects a
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cache key like ``..\\..\\secret`` even on POSIX (where backslash is a plain character).
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The function turns a surviving backslash into ``/`` so the same cache key names the
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same file on every platform.
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"""
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text = str(key)
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name = PureWindowsPath(text).name
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if not name or name != text or name in {".", ".."}:
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if not text or any(ord(ch) < 32 or ch == "\x7f" for ch in text):
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return None
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return name
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path = PureWindowsPath(text)
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if path.drive or path.root or path.anchor:
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return None
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parts = re.split(r"[\\/]", text)
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if len(parts) > MAX_CACHE_KEY_DEPTH:
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return None
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if any(not part or part in {".", ".."} or part.endswith((" ", ".")) or ":" in part for part in parts):
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return None
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return "/".join(parts)
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@@ -1408,7 +1408,11 @@ class RemoteService:
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return
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from unshackle.core.api.compression import safe_inflate
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import safe_cache_key
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS, safe_cache_key
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if len(cache_data) > MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS:
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self.log.warning(f"Ignoring {len(cache_data)} cache files from server: more than {MAX_SESSION_CACHE_KEYS}")
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return
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cache_dir = config.directories.cache / self.service_tag
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cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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@@ -1420,7 +1424,10 @@ class RemoteService:
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continue
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try:
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decompressed = safe_inflate(base64.b64decode(content))
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(cache_dir / safe_name).with_suffix(".json").write_bytes(decompressed)
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# Not with_suffix: that would turn the key "keys.v2" into "keys.json".
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target = cache_dir / f"{safe_name}.json"
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target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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target.write_bytes(decompressed)
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except Exception as e:
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self.log.warning(f"Failed to save returned cache file '{safe_name}': {e}")
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@@ -1432,10 +1439,17 @@ class RemoteService:
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The client cannot rely on the server to filter, so it sends only the files
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it can tie to the active credential or profile, plus service-global state.
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At worst, a withheld file makes the server authenticate again.
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Each cache key is the file path relative to the service cache directory,
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with posix separators and no ``.json`` suffix, so it equals the ``Cacher``
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cache key the service reads it with (``session_web/<sha1>``). The relevance check
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runs on every path segment, because a service may embed the credential
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digest or profile name in a directory name as well as in the basename.
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"""
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import zlib
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from unshackle.commands.dl import dl
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from unshackle.core.api.sanitize import safe_cache_key
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cache_dir = config.directories.cache / self.service_tag
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if not cache_dir.is_dir():
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@@ -1450,13 +1464,14 @@ class RemoteService:
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foreign = set(profiles) - {active} if isinstance(profiles, dict) else set()
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files: Dict[str, str] = {}
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for f in cache_dir.glob("*.json"):
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if f.stem.startswith("titles_"):
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for f in sorted(cache_dir.rglob("*.json")):
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key = f.relative_to(cache_dir).as_posix()[: -len(".json")]
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if f.stem.startswith("titles_") or not safe_cache_key(key):
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continue
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if not cache_stem_is_relevant(f.stem, allowed, active, foreign):
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self.log.debug(f"Withholding cache file from the remote server: {f.stem}")
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if not all(cache_stem_is_relevant(part, allowed, active, foreign) for part in key.split("/")):
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self.log.debug(f"Withholding cache file from the remote server: {key}")
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continue
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files[f.stem] = base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(f.read_bytes())).decode("ascii")
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files[key] = base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(f.read_bytes())).decode("ascii")
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return files
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