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fix: harden ClearKey/CENC decryption correctness
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"""Tests for the HLS AES-128 ClearKey DRM system (``unshackle.core.drm.clearkey``).
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Covers the correctness guards on the whole-segment AES-128-CBC path:
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- ``ClearKey.decrypt`` passing mislabeled-clear / non-block-aligned segments through
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untouched instead of crashing or corrupting (WS1 / F1+F3)
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- ``ClearKey.from_m3u_key`` ``data:`` URI parsing and 16-byte key validation (WS5 / F4)
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- the RFC 8216 §5.2 sequence-number IV deriving from a segment's absolute media
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sequence number rather than the post-filter download index (WS2 / F2)
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import m3u8
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import pytest
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from Cryptodome.Cipher import AES
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from Cryptodome.Util.Padding import pad
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from m3u8.model import Key
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from unshackle.core.drm.clearkey import SYNC_BYTE, TS_PACKET_SIZE, ClearKey
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KEY = bytes.fromhex("00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff")
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IV = bytes.fromhex("0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100")
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def encrypt(plaintext: bytes, key: bytes = KEY, iv: bytes = IV) -> bytes:
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return AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv).encrypt(pad(plaintext, AES.block_size))
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def clear_ts(packets: int = 4) -> bytes:
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# Plaintext MPEG-TS: sync byte 0x47 at every 188-byte packet boundary. Default 4 packets so
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# the fixture satisfies the hardened 4-boundary sniff (and 752 B is 16-aligned, so it must be
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# caught by the clear-TS guard, not the len%16 guard).
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return b"".join(bytes([SYNC_BYTE]) + b"\x00" * (TS_PACKET_SIZE - 1) for _ in range(packets))
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def test_valid_encrypted_segment_decrypts(tmp_path) -> None:
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plaintext = b"the quick brown fox jumps over" * 4
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seg = tmp_path / "0.ts"
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seg.write_bytes(encrypt(plaintext))
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ClearKey(key=KEY, iv=IV).decrypt(seg)
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assert seg.read_bytes() == plaintext
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def test_clear_ts_passes_through(tmp_path) -> None:
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data = clear_ts()
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seg = tmp_path / "0.ts"
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seg.write_bytes(data)
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ClearKey(key=KEY, iv=IV).decrypt(seg)
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assert seg.read_bytes() == data
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def test_non_block_aligned_passes_through(tmp_path) -> None:
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data = b"\x01" * 17 # not TS, and not a 16-byte multiple -> not valid CBC ciphertext
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assert len(data) % AES.block_size != 0
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seg = tmp_path / "0.ts"
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seg.write_bytes(data)
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ClearKey(key=KEY, iv=IV).decrypt(seg)
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assert seg.read_bytes() == data
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def test_empty_segment_does_not_crash(tmp_path) -> None:
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seg = tmp_path / "0.ts"
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seg.write_bytes(b"")
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ClearKey(key=KEY, iv=IV).decrypt(seg)
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assert seg.exists()
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assert seg.read_bytes() == b""
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def test_warns_once_per_instance(tmp_path, caplog) -> None:
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drm = ClearKey(key=KEY, iv=IV)
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for name in ("0.ts", "1.ts"):
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seg = tmp_path / name
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seg.write_bytes(clear_ts())
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with caplog.at_level("WARNING"):
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drm.decrypt(seg)
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warnings = [r for r in caplog.records if r.levelname == "WARNING"]
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assert len(warnings) == 1
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def _data_key(raw: bytes, base64_encoded: bool = True) -> Key:
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if base64_encoded:
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uri = "data:text/plain;base64," + base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii")
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else:
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uri = "data:text/plain," + raw.decode("latin-1")
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return Key(method="AES-128", uri=uri, base_uri="", keyformat=None, keyformatversions=None, iv=None)
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def test_data_uri_key_decodes_and_validates_length() -> None:
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drm = ClearKey.from_m3u_key(_data_key(KEY))
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assert drm.key == KEY
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def test_data_uri_key_wrong_length_rejected() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unexpected Length"):
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ClearKey.from_m3u_key(_data_key(b"\x00" * 8))
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def test_raw_data_uri_key_materialises_and_validates() -> None:
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# A raw (non-base64) data: payload must be taken as literal key bytes, not hex-parsed.
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drm = ClearKey.from_m3u_key(_data_key(KEY, base64_encoded=False))
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assert drm.key == KEY
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def test_raw_data_uri_key_wrong_length_rejected() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unexpected Length"):
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ClearKey.from_m3u_key(_data_key(b"\x01" * 8, base64_encoded=False))
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def test_data_uri_split_tolerates_commas_in_payload() -> None:
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# base64 with padding contains no comma, but the split must only break on the first comma
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# so a payload that itself contains a comma is not truncated. Encode a 16-byte key whose
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# base64 happens to be split-safe, and assert the mediatype comma is the only split point.
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raw = bytes(range(16))
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b64 = base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii")
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key = Key(
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method="AES-128",
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uri=f"data:application/octet-stream;base64,{b64}",
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base_uri="",
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keyformat=None,
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keyformatversions=None,
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iv=None,
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)
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drm = ClearKey.from_m3u_key(key)
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assert drm.key == raw
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SEQ_PLAYLIST = """#EXTM3U
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#EXT-X-VERSION:3
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#EXT-X-TARGETDURATION:6
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#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:100
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#EXT-X-KEY:METHOD=AES-128,URI="skd://key"
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#EXTINF:6.0,
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seg0.ts
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#EXTINF:6.0,
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seg1.ts
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#EXTINF:6.0,
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seg2.ts
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#EXTINF:6.0,
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seg3.ts
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#EXT-X-ENDLIST
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"""
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def test_sequence_number_iv_uses_absolute_media_sequence() -> None:
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"""IV must be the segment's absolute media sequence number, not the download index.
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Mirrors the derivation in ``HLS.download_track``: filtered segments are dropped, the
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surviving segments are named by post-filter download index, and the IV comes from the
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wanted segment's ``media_sequence`` (EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE + absolute position).
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"""
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master = m3u8.loads(SEQ_PLAYLIST)
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# media sequence numbers are the offset (100) plus absolute playlist position.
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assert [s.media_sequence for s in master.segments] == [100, 101, 102, 103]
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# Drop an early segment (index 1), as an OnSegmentFilter would.
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unwanted = {master.segments[1]}
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wanted_segments = [s for s in master.segments if s not in unwanted]
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# download index 1 is the SECOND surviving segment (absolute seq 102), not 101.
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download_i = 1
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seq = wanted_segments[download_i].media_sequence
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assert seq == 102
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iv = int(seq).to_bytes(16, "big")
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assert iv == (102).to_bytes(16, "big")
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# the old download-index derivation would have produced the wrong IV (100 + 1 = 101)
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assert iv != (100 + download_i).to_bytes(16, "big")
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